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"You know, in the museum in Rwanda which
commemorates the millions who lost their lives as
the world looked the other way, there is a picture of
a young boy called David - a ten year old who was
tortured to death. His last words were "don't worry the United Nations will come for us". But we never
did. That child believed the best of us only to discover that the pieties repeated so often meant in reality nothing at all." (Gordon Brown, 2008)

In July 1995, with a UN peacekeeping mission present,
a massacre took place just outside the 'safe area' of Srebrenica, a city in BosniaHerzegovina. During the civil war
in former Yugoslavia, thirty thousand Muslim refugees had
found protection in Srebrenica until the army of General
Ratko Mladic deported them and subsequently killed eight
thousand men. The United Nations had sent a peacekeeping
mission to Srebrenica to 'ensure fuIl respect for these safe
areas.' Apparently, the UN could not live up to that promise. In 1994, a different, yet comparable debacle occurred
in Rwanda. While millions were slaughtered in the Aftican
country, the United Nations stood by and watched. Peacekeepers that had been deployed to the area were withdrawn,
while Rwandan civilians were left at the mercy of uncontrolled criminals (Blocq, 2006: pp. 201).
The UN peacekeepers - the Blue Berets-form one of
the largest, best equipped, and international forces in the
world. Yet the organization's history is strewn with examples of its inability to keep the peace in places such as Srebrenica in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur. Currently there are
UN peacekeeping operations running in 16 different locations throughout five continents from Haiti to Timor, and
120 countries contribute 100,000 troops who are paid out of
the IIN's annual budget of $7.1 billion. But the UN forces
lack the authority to impose themselves on the fighters.
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Their rules of engagement do not permit it because they are
forbidden to use their weapons unless they are fired upon
(Aljazeera News, 2009).
This study explores whether there is a need to readdress
the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in
regard to protecting civilian populations in conflict zones.
This question is important because over the past decade,
conflicts have erupted across the globe, war crimes and
crimes against humanity have been easily committed by
warlords and rebels and the United Nations Security Council is yet to determine the best way to reduce civilian casualties in conflict zones around the world. The UN
peacekeeping mission is mandated to protect civilians,
however, their rules of engagement limit them to do so effectively.

to

answer this research question
through a strucfured-focused comparison of the humanitarian casualty records in conflict zones where military force
has been utilized against warlords and rebels in a bid to
protect civilians, and where military force has not been utilized. I use a structured-focused approach (George 1979)
within an outline of a 'use of force' theory. This methodology provides structure through clear definitions of key
terms, provides focus by selecting a set of hypotheses to
consider, and provides comparison through a set of case
studies (analysis of written records), with an aim of discov-

This paper tries

ering a pattern.

Although important, this paper does not focus on the
different political, economic, or ethnic motivations and implications behind the decision to use or not to use military
force. The main goal of this sfudy is to observe or measure
the difference in the number of humanitarian casualties in
comparable conflict situations where military force has
been utilized and where military force has not been utilized

138

The Honors Review

in a bid to protect civilian populations under threats of attack and death.

Approach to Studying the Use of Force in Humanitarian Intervention
The right of humanitarian intervention has been one of
the most controversial foreign policy issues of the last decade, both when intervention has happened, as in Srebrenica
and Liberia, and when it has failed to happen, as in
Rwanda and DR Congo. Thus, the need to empower and
utilize military force in order to protect civilians in conflict
zones remains debatable. According to de Waal (2007:
1039-1054) the very act of raising the prospect of external

military intervention for human protection

purposes

changes and distorts the political process and can
make a resolution more difficult.

in fact

Kuperman (2008: 49-80) argues that military intervention to protect civilians unintentionally fosters rebellion by
lowering its expected cost and increasing its likelihood of
success. In practice, intervention does sometimes help rebels attain their political goals, but usually it is too late or
inadequate to avert retaliation against civilians. Thus, the
emerging norn of military intervention resembles an imperfect insurance policy against genocidal violence.

According to Woodhouse , "there is no such thing as a
military quick fix" (2002: l4).In some cases like Somalia,
mititary intervention did not work, and in other cases, the
winning side went ahead to commit genocide against the
defeated side.

These arguments against the use of military force to
curb humanitarian crisis do not consider the ratio of the degree of humanitarian casualties when mere diplomatic and
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political dialogues have been utilized, to the degree of humanitarian casualties when military force has been utilized.
According to Christopher Clapham, the war in Rwanda was
ended not by the three and a half years of international mediation, but by the military victory of the Rwanda's Patriotic Front (Woodhouse, 2002: 11). Until the military intervention by the Rwanda Patriotic Front, over 800,000 civilians had been killed. Clapham agrees that the pursuit of
mediation settlement can have the unintentional effect of
prolonging the conflict with civilian population suffe.ing
most, while military actions have the effect of shortening
the conflict by persuading those losing ground to accept a
settlement. Citing Stedman and Licklider, David Shearer
observes that in civil wars, in general, most settlements followed a military victory rather than political negotiations or
mediated interventions (Woodhouse 2002: 9).

The Sierra Leone war of 1991 to 2001, for example,
shows the difference in the number of civilian casualties
before and after military intervention. According to Armed
conflict reports, the overall war suffered a death range of
20,000 to over 50,000. In addition, 30,000 civilians, including children, were amputated by the rebels and an estimated
215,000 to 257,000 women were victims of sexual violence during the civil war. However, when the military
peacekeeping force of the Economic Community of West
African States known as ECOMOG came to the rescue of
Sierra Leone civilians, Armed Conflicts Report claim that
only about 6,300 civilians were killed from 1998 to 2000
(Armed Conflicts Report, 2002).
Such comparative observation of civilian casualties in
conflict zones during peacekeeping missions (missions
without a mandate to use military force) and peace enforcing missions (missions with a mandate to use military
force), have lacked in previous researches. In 2001, Am-
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bassador Lakhdar Brahimi submitted a review of
peacekeeping operations to the Secretary General of the
United Nations, in which the Ambassador stated that
"peacekeepers, troops or police who witness violence
against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to
stop it" (Brahimi 2000: 62). Brahimi recoilrmended forceful
action of UN peacekeepers in case of threats to local civilians, irrespective of host nation consent.

The aim of an intervening army is simply to stop the
killing. Peacekeepers mandated to use military force prevent, contain, moderate, and terminate hostilities, frequently in protracted social conflicts within states. Deescalation of violence is vital. Conflict resolution theory
suggests causes of violent conflict and a contingency model
for de-escalation, within which military peacekeepers separate belligerents to stop the violence and work closely with
civilians to reduce its causes. Military doctrine suggests
that liaison, negotiation, and force deployment help to control violence (Walzer, 2002: The argument about humanitarian intervention).
Plan of Study

The humanitarian casualty report is one source of information that has not been considered to the degree it
should be considered, in regards to the argument of whether
or not military force should be utilized in humanitarian intervention. Even though the humanitarian casualty records
contain estimated numbers, they can help us to evaluate
which mission (peacekeeping or peace-enforcing) has been
more effective in reducing civilian casualties.
Before stating my plan of study I will define two key
terms, relevant to this study; peacekeeping and peaceenforcement.
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Peacekeeping: This term as defined by the United Nations
is a way to help countries torn by conflict to create conditions for sustainable peace. Peacekeepers monitor and observe peace processes in post-conflict areas and assist excombatants in implementing the peace agreements they
may have signed. Such assistance comes in many forms,
including confidence-building measures, power-sharing
arrangements, electoral support, strengthening the rule of
law, and economic and social development. UN peacekeepers can include soldiers, civilian police officers, and
other civilian personnel.

Peace-enforcement: This term entails the use of armed
force to separate combatants and to create a cease-fire that
does not exist. Force may also be used to create other
peaceful ends such as safe havens for victims of the hostilities. The United Nations also uses this term to refer to
forceful actions to keep a cease-fire from being violated or
to reinstate a failed cease-fire.

My plan of study is to compare the statistical records of
civilian deaths in conflict zones where peacekeeping missions have been utilized and where peace-enforcement missions have been utilized. My study is on conflict zones such
as Srebrenica in Bosnia, Sudan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
These samples are selected for my study because they have
similar elements: warlords or rebel groups fighting for political or ideological supremacy with civilian populations as
primary targets.

Civilian Death Records in the conflict zones selected for
this study
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Srebrenica in Bosnia:
When the United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR,
was deployed to Srebrenica in 1993, the Security Council
gave the peacekeepers limited firepower and a weak mandate which made it difficult for them to protect the civilian
population against afrocities. In the suillmer of t995,
lightly-armed peacekeepers stood by powerless; as thousands of men in Srebrenica were murdered in what they had
been told was a safe haven. Before the use of military force
against Serbia, over 200,000 Muslim civilians had been
systematically murdered. More than 20,000 were missing
and feared dead and 2,000,000 became refugees (United
Human Rights: Bosnia genocide). After the bombing it was
reported that abofi 445 civilians were killed directly from
the NATO bombings (Dankovic, 1999). However, it was
Operation Deliberate Force (The Air campaign initiated by
NATOruNPROFOR) utilized against Bosnian-Serbs
throughout the country in August and September 1995
which produced the results that allowed agreements to be
reached (Berdal, 2002. pp. 64).

Rwanda:
As of July, 1994, over 800,000 civilians had been killed in
Rwandan conflict (Historical chronology: Rwanda). The
peace-enforcing mission of the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) came to the rescue of civilians in Rwanda. The RPF
soldiers saved tens of thousands of people from annihilation and relentlessly pursued those whom they thought
guilty of genocide (Human Rights Watch, 1999). Before
the RPF intervention, the civilian death estimated was between 500,000 and 1,000,000 in 1994. However, tens of
thousands of civilians were reported to have been killed
during the RPF forceful intervention (Armed conflict reports: Rwanda).
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Sierra Leone:
Between 1998 and 1999, more than 6,300 people, mostly
civilians, were killed during the Sierra Leone's civil war.
An estimate of the total civilian deaths ranges from 80,000
to 100,000 from l99l to 2002.In addition, 30,000 civilians,
including children, have had limbs hacked off by the warring rebels. An estimated 215,000 to 257,000 women were
victims of sexual violence during the civil war (Armed
Conflict report: Sierra Leone, 2000).

Liberia:
From 1989 to 1996 the total number of civilian deaths in
Liberia was about 200,000. Between 1999 and 2003, the
total number of deaths was estimated at 150,000 and over a
hundred thousand people were displaced (Liberia: First and
Second Civil War, 2000).
Somalia:
Independent media reports estimate that close to 400,000
Somali lives have been lost due to armed conflict between
1998 and 2007. According to Armed Conflict reports, in
2007 alone more than 6,500 civilians were estimated to
have been killed in the conflict in Mogadishu with more
than 8,500 wounded. These counts do not include military
deaths which would likely increase the total number of
casualtie s significantly.

However, the fighting in Somalia has been recur:ring. The
second IIN peacekeeping Mission to Somalia (UNOSOM
II) was deployed in May 1993 to assist the Somalia people
in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life (Berdal, 2002. pp.56). However, the political situation in Somalia remains in a state of unrest, and the after-
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effects of the 1989-1992 civil war has turned the country
into a lawless, violent, and undemocratic state with an
alarming humanit arrafl crisis.

Congo:

An estimated 350,000 people have been killed as a direct
consequence of violence. In total, an estimated 5.4 million
people have died as a result of the conflict, the vast
majority from malnutrition and disease. The International
Rescue Committee in conjunction with Australia's Burnet
Institute released a study in January 2008 showing over
45,000 non-combatant (civilian) deaths per month. The
conflict has internally displaced an additional 3.4 million
people (Armed Conflict Report: DR Congo, 2008).

Sudan:
So far, over 2.5 million civilians have been displaced and
the death toll is variously estimated from 200,000 to
400,000 killed. These figures have remained stagnant since
initial UN reports of the conflict hinted at genocide in
2004. Between 1998 and2007, about 72,000 civilians were
killed in the Sudan conflict directly from the fighting and
subsequently from famine. The conflict in Sudan has
caused the death of an estimated 2 million people, directly
or indirectly, since 1983. Sudan currently has the largest
internally displaced population in the world, estimate d at 4
million people (The Genocide in Darfur, 2008).

Humanitarian Intervention, Konye Obaji Ori

Table
Conflict zone
Bo sni a

Rwanda

erra Leone

U

Mission

Peacekeeping (UNoMUR)
Peace-enf o rcement (RPF)

1993to 1996
1994to 1995

Peacekeeping (UNOMSIL)
Peace-enf o rcement (EcoMoG)

1998to 1999
1997t0 1999

,

Sudan

Peacekeepins (UNOSOM I I
Peace-enf o rcernent (US ARMY)
Peacekeeping (UNOSOM ll )

Civilian Deaths
200,000

1995

1989t0 1996

;

CorEo

Durati o n

1992to 1995

Peacekeeping (UNMIL)

DR

l.

Peacekeepi ng (UNPROFOR)
Peace-enfo rcement (UNPRoFoR/NATo}

beri a

Somalia
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1990to 1996
1999to 2OO3

1992to 1993
1993

445

.

800,000
4o,ooo
30,000
10,000

:
,
i

2Or0OO

180,000
,150,000

1"000
150

1993t0 1995
1988 to 2007

400,000

Peacekeeping (MONUC)

1999to 2009

400o,00o

Peacekeeping (UNMIS)
Peacekeeping (UNAMID)

2o05to 2OO7
2o07to 2009

10o,o0o

1984to 2002

2,O00,ooo

500

70,000

Data compiled from Armed Conflict Reports, Modern Conflict Data, and Britannica Year Book: Death Tolls
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Independent Samples T-Test:
(Peacekeeping

:

l, peace-enforcement - 0)
Group Stetistics
N

Mission

l0 437150.00001

I

Civilian
Deaths

Std. Deviation

Mean

0

5

Std. Error
Mean

9.31409E5

2.94537E5

46l le.ooool 76592.t1728

34253.03616

Independent Samples Test

Levene's
Test for

Equality of
t-test for Equality of Means

Variances
Sig.

F

t

sig.

Civilian Equal
Deaths variances 2.788 I I 9 .920

df
13

(2Mean
Std. Error
tailed) Difference Difference

.374 3.9 r031E5

4.25lllE5

assumed

Equal
variances

not

1.319 9.24r

.219 3.91031E5 2.9652285

95% Confidence Interval of the Difference

Lower

5.27365E5

2.77089E5

Upper
1.30943E6

1.05915E6

assumed

* Curve Estimation.
The result of this difference of means test is suggestive
rather than statistically significant.
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Curve Fit:
Model Description

MOD_I

Model Name

Dependent

I

CivilianDeaths

Variable

Equation

Linear

1

Independent Variable

Mission

Constant

Included

Variable Whose Values Label Observations in Plots

Unspecified

Case Processing Summary

N
Total Cases

15

Excluded Casesu

0

Forecasted Cases

0

Newly Created Cases

0

Variable Processing Summary
Variables
Dependent

Independent

Civilian
Mission

Deaths

Number of Positive Values

I5

I0

Number of Zeros
Number of Negative Values

0

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

Number of

Values

Missing User-Missing
SystemMissing
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Model Summary and Parameter Estimates
Dependent Variable:
Civilian Deaths
Model Summary

Parameter Estimates

R
Equation Square

Linear

F

dfl dn sig
I l3

.061 846

.37

Constant

bl

4 46119.000 39103 I .000

The independent variable
is Mission.

Results and Discussion
Duration
Cumulative
Civilian
Deaths

1992
to
2009

Peacekeeping

Peace-

4,371,500

enforcement
461,190

Death
Ratio

9:l

Over all, the result of the independent samples T-Test is
suggestive rather than statistically significant, but it has
shown through a comparison of recorded data that the civilian casualties in conflict zones where peace-enforcement
missions have been utilized are comparatively lower than
civilian casualties in conflict zones where peacekeeping
missions have been utilized; within a conflict time frame.
However, it is mandatory to clariff that the death tolls
are roughly estimated. Also, the number of civilians who
die subsequently from the negative effects of the conflicts
(hunger, diseases, displacements, etc) has not been accurately controlled for in this study.
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CivilianDeaths

D

0

Obs.rvGd

-Lilc{

o

'1.00

0.20

Mission

Based on the Curve Fit data, the graph of civilian deaths

plotted against the two types of peace missions utilized
(peacekeeping coded as 'l' and peace-enforcement coded
as '0'), show an inclining death rate as mission moves from
peace-enforcement (0) to peacekeeping (l).

What this study intends to do next is assess what factors
have accounted for this observation that peace-enforcement
missions result in fewer civilian deaths than peacekeeping
missions. This will be done by reviewing previous studies
on the causes of civilian deaths.

Root Causes of Civilian Deaths in Conflict Zones
According to Swedish peace and conflict researcher
Hultman (2006), in civil war, rebel groups often target
civilians despite the fact that their actual target is the
government. "Rebels are almost always considerably
weaker than the government and are often lacking the
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means for defeating government forces by military action.
Therefore, they seek alternative means to pressure the government into making concessions. Violence towards civilians is one such strategy," explains Hultman.
In her dissertation, Targeting the Unarmed: Strategic
Rebel Violence in Ctvil War, Hultman shows that rebel
groups primarily target civilians when they believe it will
help them debilitate the govemment. "A strong parallel can
be drawn between these types of attacks and terrorist attacks. Groups that rebel against a democratic state are more
inclined to affack civilians," she states (Hultman, 2006).
She also describes violence towards civilians as an intentional group strategy rather than individual action taken by
undisciplined rebels. By attacking the populations that the
government is dependent on, rebels cause the government
indirect harm (Hultman, 2006).
In her research paper, Hultman proposes that when
fighting is low, governments try to avoid killing civilians
unless the threat is large enough. Rebels, on the other hand,
kill civilians to signal resolve in order to gain concessions.
However, as the intensity level increases, control becomes
more important, so both parties target civilians to establish
territorial control and undermine the support of the opponent.
Using new data on killings of civilians, Hultman examines all conflict actors in an internal armed conflict from
1992 to 2004. The findings suggest that rebels use violence
for communicative purposes in less intense conflicts, characterized by more violence when rebels are relatively
strong and early in the conflict.
In more intense conflicts, on the other hand, violence is
used to secure control and compensate for lack in military
capacity - then the weaker groups kill more civilians, and
they are likely to kill more civilians the longer the conflict.
Governments kill more civilians when the rebel opposition
is strong; surprisingly they kill fewer civilians the longer
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the conflict and democracy is not found to have any affect
on govemment behavior (Hultman, 2006).
Civilian fatalities in wartime have climbed from five
percent at the turn of the century to more than ninety percent in the wars of the 1990s. New weapons and patterns of
conflict that include deliberate attacks against civilians are
increasingly turning children into primary targets of war.
Even humanitarian activities that were once safe from attack are now treated as legitimate military objectives. Relief convoys, health clinics and feeding centers have all become targets (UNICEF Report, 2008).

Responsibility to Protect:
While peace enforcement has largely been avoided in
the past, the level of violence with which peacekeeping operations in many areas, including the 1994 events in
Rwanda where several Belgian soldiers (UNAMIR) were
forced to watch the ongoing massacres and were ultimately
killed without being allowed to engage, has shocked the
international community and led to crisis where willingness
to enter peacekeeping operations without the ability to use
force is juxtaposed with an unwillingness of nations to enter their forces in potentially dangerous conflicts which
would not otherwise involve them (Peace Enforcement,
2000).

In its efforts to help prevent civilian casualties in conflict zones worldwide, the International Crisis Group has
consistently drawn upon the doctrine of the Responsibility
to Protect (R2P). This phrase is used primarily as an objective to provide a legal and ethical basis for humanitarian
intervention-the intervention by external actors (preferably the international community through the United Nations) in a state that is unwilling or unable to prevent or
stop genocide, massive killings, and other massive human
rights violations. This has been done through peacekeeping

1s2

The Honors Review

missions and peace-enforcing missions. Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged Heads of State
and governments to embrace the 'Responsibility to Protect'
as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic
cleansing, and crimes against humanity (International Crisis Group, 2001).

Stopping Rebel's Atrocities:
As Hultam's research has shown, civilians are the main
targets of rebels and warlords. Thus the number of civilian
deaths in conflict zones is to some degree dependent on
whether or not peace missions are deployed and whether or
not the peace missions deployed are mandated to utilize
military force in curbing rebel groups from attacking civilian populations both in safe-zones and non safe-zones.
The mandates given to peacekeeping missions are often
between traditional methods of creating demilitarized safezones and resolving disputes peacefully, such as ensuring
cease-fire and peace agreements through negotiation and
mediation, and delivering humanitarian aid under Chapter

VI of the United Nations Charter (United Nations

Peacekeeping).
Peacekeeping missions which often comprise of soldiers
are sometimes armed, but do not have to engage in combat.

Restricted by their rules of engagement, they have often
allowed rebels and warlords the opporrunity to affack civilian populations and commit crimes against humanity
(Shawcross, 2000). It is impracticable to keep peace that
has not been attained. In the seven conflict zones observed
in this study, an estimated 4.3 million civilians have been
killed between 1992 and 2009 under peacekeeping missions.

Peace-enforcement missions are mandated to use military force to combat rebels and warlords, forcing them to
retreat, surrender, or agree to peace treaties as mandated in
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their rules of engagement. The peace-enforcement doctrine
emphasizes that force can be applied impartially if the focus of military action is firmly geared towards ensuring
compliance with a given mandate (Berdal, 2002. pp. 62). In
the seven conflict zones observed in this study, an estimated 461,190 civilians have been killed between 1992 and
2009 under peace-enforcing missions.
The initiation of numerous UN peace operations by the
Security Council since the end of the Cold War has been
bolstered by strongly worded and finely crafted resolutions.
However, the emphasis placed in such resolutions on restoring peace and security by all necessary means loses its
resonance when UN troops are constrained by their national
law from employing sufficient force to achieve mission objectives (Stephen, 2002, pp. 157). The case of Somalia illustrates how the adoption, interpretation, and evolution of
the peace-enforcement mandate, including the question of
how the use of force critically depends on the interplay of
personalities, competing motivations, and constraints (Berdal,2002.pp. 62).
After the humiliations of Somalia and Bosnia, the Security Council of the United Nations was reluctant to get too
deeply involved in Rwanda. At the time of the first reports
of genocide in May 1994, there was already a small UN
peacekeeping force in Rwanda. However, it was illequipped to deal with the scale of the bloodshed, and most
countries immediately withdrew their contingents. Eventually the Security Council approved a force of 5,500, but
most of the troops were not forthcoming. The UN has since
admitted that it failed to prevent the genocide; and ignored
warnings of what was to come (uN Peacekeeping Record:
BBC News, 2000).
The IJN's peacekeepers in Sierra Leone were illequipped and poorly trained. The rebels managed to steal
UN weapons, tanks, and uniforms; and kidnap hundreds of
UN peacekeepers. When the Nigerian-led force, Ecomog,
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withdrew because of domestic pressures, the peacekeeping
operation descended into chaos. The UN force was mainly
drawn from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and
South Asia-countries that had little experience of working
together and whose soldiers were badly organized (uN
Peacekeeping Record: BBC News, 2000).
Conclusions and Limitations:

At the most general level, this study through a structured
focus comparison of the humanitarian casualty account of
conflict zones suggests that the number of civilian deaths in
conflict zones also depends on whether or not the deployed
missions are mandated to utilize military force against rebels and warlords who are often responsible for civilian
deaths and humanitarian crisis.

The result of this study strongly supported earlier research showing that warring factions can be made to retreat
from civilian safe-zones or surrender and agree to peace
talks when military force is utilized (Clapham, 1998). It
was Operation Deliberate Force (the air campaign initiated
by NATO/LTNPROFOR) utilized against Bosnian-Serbs
throughout the country in August and September 1995, and
it alone which produced the results that allowed agreement
to be reached (Berdal, 2002. pp. 64).
Although there are several issues to consider when deliberating over military force and humanitarian intervention, according to this study, the necessary first step by the
UN Security Council in future peace missions deployments
should be to reflect on the fact that civilian casualties under
previous peacekeeping missions is higher than civilian
casualties under previous peace-enforcing mis s ions.

With the number of civilians (non-combatants) deliberately killed during conflicts, there is a need to readdress the
mandates of the UN peacekeeping missions, deployed with
a responsibility to protect. LrN peacekeepers may be man-
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dated to use collective action (including necessary military
force) against genocide, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity. The soldiers that constitute the peace
missions should be able to defend themselves and the civilians they are there to protect. They should be able to respond to efforts by rebels and warlords to undermine peace
agreements;or attack civilians.
After reviewing the failures and successes of previous
peace-enforcement missions and peacekeeping missions,
perhaps a simultaneous deployment of both missions during humanitarian intervention may be more effective in reducing humanitarian crisis as the UN assumes the responsibility to protect non-combatant populations.
Conversely, it is important to acknowledge that some of
the key criticisms of this study relate to the fact that the
cases observed are hand-picked, and possible antecedent
variables that affect the dependent variable civilian deaths;
are overlooked. Choosing to randomly select the cases-and
exploring the nature, location, and the socio-political complications of the conflicts in relation to the civilian casualty
record would be one way of addressing this criticism. Finally, the weight of this study is limited to conflicts within
a state; such as ethnic, religious, racial, conflicts or conflicts.
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